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Conspiracies to Monopolize:
A Decisional Model
WILLIAM C. HOLMES*
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits actual monopolization, attempts
to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize.' While much has been writ-
ten about the first two categories of Section 2 offenses, 2 virtually nothing has
been written concerning the offense of conspiring to monopolize. The paucity
of the literature on the subject is surprising, since the topic is one of the least
settled areas of antitrust law, with considerable controversy in the courts
concerning the essential elements of a Section 2 conspiracy.
This Article attempts to shed needed light on the subject by analyzing
some of the leading cases involving alleged Sherman Act conspiracies to
monopolize. The analysis reveals that much of the confusion in the courts is
apparently due to a failure to distinguish between two altogether different
types of conspiracies that have been challenged under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. One group of cases has involved conspiracies in which the
participants to the conspiracy jointly possess actual monopoly power. A sec-
ond group of cases has involved incipient conspiracies to monopolize in which
monopoly power has not yet been achieved. As will be seen in this Article,
each of these forms of Section 2 conspiracies entails a different set of relevant
considerations, so that the failure to draw a distinction between the two types
of conspiracies is no doubt largely responsible for the state of uncertainty
found in many of the existing judicial decisions.
The discussion that follows has been divided into three parts. Part I
examines the leading Sherman Act Section 2 conspiracy cases in which the
conspirators jointly possess monopoly power. The legal principles that govern
cases of this type are identified and explored. Part II of the Article examines
Section 2 conspiracies to monopolize in which joint monopoly power has not
yet been achieved. The governing legal principles are likewise identified and
critiqued for these cases. Part III pulls together the key elements developed in
the two prior sections and suggests a coordinated decisional model for use in
analyzing Section 2 conspiracy cases and in assessing their antitrust legality.
*Staff attorney, Federal Trade Commission; B.A., Stanford University, 1969; J.D., Harvard University,
1973; member, Illinois and California Bars. The views expressed in this Article are the author's own and should
not be taken as representing those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner.
I. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic
Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 375 (1974); Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize-Specific Intent as
Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1121 (1973); Note, Attempts to Monopolize Under the
Sherman Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1451
(1973); Note, Monopolization Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 22 S.C.L. REV. 344 (1970); Note, Attempts
to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act: Interpretation and Recent Proposals, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 829 (1979).
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I. CONSPIRACIES TO MONOPOLIZE IN WHICH THE
CONSPIRATORS JOINTLY POSSESS MONOPOLY POWER
Two cases frequently cited as leading precedent on Sherman Act con-
spiracies to monopolize are the Supreme Court's decisions in American
Tobacco Co. v. United States3 and United States v. Griffith.4 However, a
careful reading of these cases reveals that they involved some of the strongest
evidence of actual monopolization, let alone of conspiracies to monopolize,
that the Supreme Court has ever faced. Consequently, the conspiracy ele-
ments that the Court prescribed in these decisions are limited to only a partic-
ular type of Sherman Act Section 2 conspiracy-namely, one in which actual
monopoly power has been jointly achieved by the conspirators.
American Tobacco was a criminal antitrust action against the three dom-
inant producers of cigarettes, several of their officials, and a subsidiary of one
of the three companies. The defendants were convicted on four counts under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act: conspiracy in restraint of trade, monop-
olization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize. Certior-
ari was granted on the narrow issue of "whether actual exclusion of competi-
tors is necessary to the crime of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman
Act."5 The Supreme Court held that actual exclusion is not an element of the
offense and that it is enough that "power exists to raise prices or to exclude
competition when it is desired to do so.
' 6
In so holding, however, the Court went far beyond the narrow legal issue
actually before it. Detailed attention was given to the conspiracy evidence on
which the convictions were based, consisting of evidence that the defendants
had, through a variety of concerted actions, 7 achieved joint control over more
than sixty-eight percent of the national cigarette market and eighty percent of
the field of cigarettes comparable to those produced by the defendants."
Given the strength of the conspiracy evidence and the clearly dominant
market share jointly achieved by the defendants, 9 the Court readily concluded
that a Sherman Act Section 2 conspiracy had been established. The Court
outlined the elements of analogous Section 2 conspiracy cases in the following
terms:
3. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
4. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
5. 328 U.S. 781, 784 (1946).
6. Id. at 811.
7. The defendants had conspired to control the purchase of the raw materials (leaf tobacco) used in the
production of their products by concerting control of existing tobacco auction markets, discouraging the estab-
lishment of new auction markets, bidding up the prices competitors had to pay for their supplies, and buying up
lower grades of tobacco so as to prevent competition by manufacturers of lower priced cigarettes. In addition,
the defendants had conspired to fix cigarette prices at a level that would thwart competition by cheaper grade
cigarettes.
8. 328 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1946).
9. Predominant market shares can be compelling evidence that monopoly power has been achieved. See,
e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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A correct interpretation of the statute and of the authorities makes it the crime of
monopolizing, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, for parties, as in these cases, to
combine or conspire to acquire or maintain the power to exclude competitors from
any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations, provided they also have such a power that they are able, as a group, to
exclude actual or potential competition from the field and provided that they have
the intent and purpose to exercise that power.'
Further elaboration of the law of Section 2 conspiracies was provided by
the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Griffith." The
case involved a government antitrust action against a group of motion picture
exhibitors, alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
exhibitors controlled all motion picture theatres in numerous towns through-
out a broad geographic circuit. They misused the buying power that this
control gave them to exact from distributors preferential contracts giving the
exhibitors exclusive "first-run" rights to movies in not only those towns that
they controlled but in other towns where they had competitors.
The district court dismissed the complaint in Griffith on the ground that
the government failed to prove that the conspirators had acted for the specific
"purpose" of driving out their competitors and monopolizing the theatre
circuit. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that since the conspirators
had actually "bargained for and obtained" monopoly rights "by the use of
monopoly power, ' 12 it was not necessary to prove "specific intent
to . . . build a monopoly.' 3 Rather, it was sufficient that a "necessary and
direct result" of the conspirators' joint conduct was the "monopolizing of
trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act. ' 0 4 The Court was careful to
distinguish the case, however, from other cases in which actual monopoly
power has not yet been achieved.' 5
Taken together, American Tobacco, Griffith, and other analogous cases16
suggest a number of relevant factors to be considered when assessing the
Section 2 legality of those conspiracies in which the participants jointly pos-
sess monopoly power. The most obvious such factor is proof of the conspir-
10. 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
11. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
12. Id. at 109.
13. Id. at 105.
14. Id. at 105-06.
15. Thus, the Court stated, "Specific intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is
necessary only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the Act." United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
16. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Schine
Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
,1944).
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acy itself. Once the existence of a conspiracy has been established, 7 the
market shares or other indicators of market power of the individual conspira-
tors can be aggregated and viewed as a whole for purposes of determining
whether the conspirators have actual monopoly power. 8 If it is demonstrated
that they jointly possess such power, it must then be proven that they have
the "intent and purpose" to exercise this power. 9 The "intent" that must be
demonstrated is not, however, the more demanding "specific intent" that
must be shown if monopoly power has not yet been reached. Rather, the
necessary inquiry is into whether the conspirators intend to engage in con-
certed action having the "necessary and direct result" of monopolizing the
industry.2
American Tobacco and Griffith are noteworthy not only for the principles
they set forth, but also for the questions that they raise and fail to answer.
American Tobacco prohibits conspiracies to monopolize "any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states," 2' provided that the requisite
showings of monopoly power and intent are made. But what "part" of trade
and commerce did the Court have in mind? Must a full-blown "relevant
market" be proven, as in single firm monopolization cases, or will something
less suffice?
Griffith likewise suggests a troubling issue. The decision prohibits
conspiratorial acts by companies having joint monopoly power, if the "neces-
sary and direct result" of the acts is "monopolization.' '22 But what types of
acts are so prohibited: all those having such a consequence or only those that
are shown to be predatory or otherwise competitively unreasonable?
Regarding the first of these unanswered questions, definition of the rele-
vant market, it is helpful to examine the leading Supreme Court decision on
single firm monopolization, as distinguished from attempts or conspiracies to
monopolize. That case, United States v. Grinnell Corp.,23 involved the mon-
opolization of the national accredited central station alarm market by four
17. Proof of a conspiracy can be found not only in an exchange of words but in a course of dealing between
the conspirators or other circumstantial evidence. In American Tobacco, for example, the conspiracy was
proven by parallel behavior and by dealings between the conspirators. See also United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) ("prima facie" conspiracy established by industry-wide licensing agreements
entered into with knowledge of the adherence of others in a common illegal scheme); United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (conspiracy established by course of dealing and by statements of co-conspir-
ators). See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 311-29 (1977); J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUSr LAW AND
TRADE REGULATION § 9.02[2] (1979).
18. Aggregation of the conspirators' market shares can convincingly establish the existence ofjoint mon-
opoly power. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (a combined market share
of over 80%); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) (a combined market share of over
94%).
19. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
20. See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
21. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
22. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
23. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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affiliated corporations.24 The companies had seized eighty-seven percent of
the market through a variety of exclusionary practices, including the acquisi-
tion of competitors, the allocation of markets among themselves, and threats
of retaliatory pricing against potential competitors. In finding that actual
monopolization had occurred, the Supreme Court articulated the following
standard for the offense of monopolization:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.
5
In essence, the Court identified three separate components of the offense
of single firm monopolization: (1) proof of the "relevant market";26 (2) the
possession of "monopoly power" within that market;27 and (3) the "willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power," as opposed to market power
achieved through competitively justifiable means. 28 Grinnell thus explicitly
required that a "relevant market" be proven for cases involving Sherman Act
charges of single firm monopolization.
Should a Section 2 conspiracy to monopolize be treated any differently?
Logic suggests not. The function of market definition in a single firm monopo-
lization case is to focus inquiry on the particular competitive area within
which the defendant has allegedly achieved monopoly power.29 Since mon-
opoly power is defined as the power to "control prices or exclude competi-
24. The companies were a parent corporation and its three subsidiaries. Since multiple corporations were
involved, the case arguably could have been brought as a "conspiracy to monopolize." See, e.g., United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See generally J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE
REGULATION § 9.04121 (1979). The case instead came before the Supreme Court as an actual monopolization
case, with the affiliated corporations treated as divisions of a single entity.
25. 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
26. The Court adopted the "du Pont" relevant market test, which requires consideration of the interchange-
ability of substitute products and cross-elasticity of demand. Id. at 571-72 (1966). In addition, the Court indicated
that the "Brown Shoe" submarket indicia, employed in Clayton Act § 7 cases, may also be employed in Sherman
Act § 2 cases. Id. at 572. For further information concerning proofof "relevant markets," see ABA ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 48-52 (1975); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 41-47 (1977); J. VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.02[21 (1979); Holmes and Hennigan, Antitrust Law Develop-
ments, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 309, 309-18 (1978).
27. The Court held that proofofmonopoly power can be inferred from a "predominant share ofthe market,"
and that the 87% share held by the defendants was a predominant share. 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). See also the
cases cited in note 18 supra. For general information on proof of monopoly power, see ABA ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 53-55 (1975); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 74-93 (1977); J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.0213] (1979).
28. The Court concluded that the extreme exclusionary practices engaged in by the defendants clearly met
this requirement. 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). For recent cases attempting to clarify the distinction between the
"willful acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly power, and permissible acts allowed by Grinnell, see California
Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975); and
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 106-32 (1977);
J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.02[4] (1979).
29. See generally Note, Relevant Geographic Market Delineation: The Interchangeability of Standards in
Cases Arising Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1152; Note,
Prosecutions for Attempt to Monopolize: The Relevance of the Relevant Market, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 110 (1967).
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tion, ' '31 it is necessary to identify with some precision the area of trade within
which the defendant allegedly enjoys this price and production control. As the
Supreme Court has said, "[W]here there are market alternatives that buyers
may readily use for their purposes, illegal monopoly does not exist." '31 Defin-
ition of the relevant market simply reflects judicial recognition of these
market alternatives.
In a similar vein, relevant market definition in a conspiracy to monopol-
ize case focuses attention on the area of competition within which the con-
spirators have allegedly "conspired" to seize monopoly power over product
price and production. If, because of the ready availability of competitive
products even after the conspiracy has achieved all of its objectives, the
conspiracy cannot achieve such price and output control, then it is erroneous
to argue that the conspirators "intended" to achieve "monopoly power."
This is like arguing that a group of marksmen, having intentionally shot their
arrows at a small pine tree, actually "intended" to hit a large oak at which
they weren't even aiming. This is neither sound logic nor a sensible applica-
tion of judicial resources, since it encourages Section 2 conspiracy cases that
have nothing to do with the true antimonopolization functions of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act.32
An excellent illustration of the bizarre results that can follow from failing
to require proof of the relevant market in Section 2 conspiracy cases is the
1961 decision of United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corporation.3 The
case involved an alleged Section 2 conspiracy among several linen supply
services in the greater metropolitan New York area to control the market by
allocating customers and coercing other linen supply services into joining the
conspiracy. The conspiracy had achieved control of only about one percent of
the linen supply business in the affected geographic area. The Second Circuit
nevertheless held that this miniscule market share was not pertinent, since,
according to the court, proof of the "relevant market" is not an essential
element of a Section 2 conspiracy case, and all that need be shown is an effect
upon some "appreciable" amount of interstate commerce ($523,168 in linen
supply business was held to be sufficient).'
The insignificant market share in Consolidated Laundries should have
been highly germane to a sensible resolution of the case. With only one
percent of a market characterized by numerous small competing concerns, it
is hard to see how the conspirators "intended" to achieve monopoly control.
The defendants' insignificant share of the market should have cut strongly
against the finding of intent essential to a Section 2 conspiracy to monopolize,
30. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). See generally the cases and
articles cited at notes 18 and 27 supra.
31. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956).
32. For a very good discussion of the arguments for and against requiring relevant market definition in
conspiracy to monopolize cases, see Note, The Relevant Market Concept in Conspiracy to Monopolize Cases
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1977).
33. 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
34. Id. at 572-73.
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making market shares and, hence, relevant market definition potentially vital
issues in the case.
As indicated above, definition of the relevant market was not the only
issue suggested but left unresolved by the Supreme Court's decisions in
American Tobacco and Griffith. A further unanswered question was whether
any joint action that contributes to the maintenance of monopoly power in
the hands of a group of alleged conspirators will constitute Section 2 monopo-
lizing misconduct. The sweeping language in Griffith35 can arguably be read in
just such a manner, leaving no room for concerted action by a group of
companies once it is shown that they jointly possess monopoly power, if a
result of such action is the maintenance of their market dominance.
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court intended such a draconian result.
To suggest otherwise would be to proscribe virtually any coordinated action
by a group of companies that can be characterized as jointly possessing
monopoly control over prices and output, regardless of the motivations be-
hind the action. Assume, for example, that the major producers of drugs for a
debilitating disease, having failed in their individual attempts to develop a
complete treatment for the disease, pool their research capabilities to ac-
complish this objective, subject to the express requirement that they will
license the fruits of their joint work to anyone else on nondiscriminatory
terms. It is probable that the "first entrant" advantages in such a project will
be substantial, severely undercutting the ability of later licensee entrants to
compete on truly equal terms with those participating in the venture. Argu-
ably, then, a "necessary and direct result" of such a research effort would be
to further entrench and maintain the market dominance of the research partic-
ipants. Does this mean that such a project, or any similar coordinated venture
among the dominant firms within an industry, is flatly proscribed by Section 2
of the Sherman Act?
Surely this was not what the Supreme Court intended, for other decisions
by the Court and lower federal courts have explicitly recognized that illegal
monopolization does not result from literally any act that can be said to
produce or maintain monopoly power. As expressed by the Supreme Court,
the offense of monopolization prohibits only the "willful acquisition or main-
tenance" of monopoly power, "as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.",3 6 Similarly, Judge Wyzanski, in the oft-cited case of United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,37 drew an express distinction between illegal
monopolizing conduct and market dominance resulting from such pro-compe-
titive factors as "superior skill," "superior products," "economic or tech-
35. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
36. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
37. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
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nological efficiency," and "scientific research. ' 38 These and similar cases
demonstrate that Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not a rigid statute looking
only to demonstrations of market share, but, instead, contains both flexibility
and a willingness to consider possible justifications for challenged business
practices.
Thus, at least some give and take seems both necessary and appropriate
for Sherman Act Section 2 cases, even those involving alleged conspiracies
already in possession of monopoly power, with the key question being how to
build this flexibility into the case law. One possible approach can be readily
rejected: it does not seem appropriate to simply carry over into the context
of Section 2 conspiracies that have achieved monopoly power the same
economic justifications suitable for either single firm monopolization cases or
for incipient Section 2 conspiracies to monopolize. The potential hazards to
competition become greater when companies act in concert than when they
act alone, making joint action between competitors inherently more suspect.
Similarly, the needed flexibility diminishes as the market control of the
conspirators increases, because the dangers to competition are more obvious
when the participants to an illegal conspiracy have already achieved control
over the industry.39
Accordingly, less flexibility is called for in Section 2 conspiracies in-
volving the actual possession of monopoly power than in either single firm
monopolization cases or conspiracies that have not yet achieved industry
dominance. This distinction is best explained by means of an illustration.
Assume that a single firm monopolist has provided the funding to an indepen-
dent research laboratory to develop a new form of a drug, in return for
exclusive rights in the fruits of the research. Such an arrangement may argu-
ably further entrench the monopolist's market dominance, but, nevertheless,
be justifiable under Section 2, as, for example, where the monopolist reason-
ably would not have provided the funding without the protection of exclusive
rights and where the research would not otherwise have been done.40 Next,
assume that a similar research arrangement is entered into by a group of
competing companies that do not individually or jointly have market power.
The exclusivity of the arrangement may again pass Section 2 muster. For
example, the arrangement may actually enhance competition between the
participants and larger nonparticipating firms, giving the small firms the
38. Id. at 342. See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d263,291 n.50 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (distinguishing between the misuse of monopoly power and competitive advantages
achieved through "'efficiency, prestige, and innovativeness"); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416,430 (2d Cir. 1945) (distinguishing between illegal monopolizing behavior and monopolies created by "force of
accident" or "superior skill, foresight and industry").
39. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980), in which the Second Circuit observed that the "benefits and detriments" of joint action will "vary
with the circumstances," with "the market power of the participant finns" likely to be "the most significant
factor." Id. at 301.
40. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.
1981); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), affd, 351 U.S. 377
(1956).
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benefits of research that none of them could have funded on its own.4 ' Lastly,
assume that the research funding comes from a group of competitors posses-
sing joint monopoly power, and that they, too, demand exclusive rights in the
fruits of the research. Section 2 may well prohibit the exclusivity of this
arrangement, due to the added competitive danger inherent in joint action by
companies already in control of an industry. 42
A similar line of reasoning is employed by the Justice Department in its
recently announced Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures.43
The Guide observes that joint research and product development
ventures may give rise to a broad range of potential antitrust problems,
including possible challenges as illegal Section 2 conspiracies to monopolize.
It then presents a highly useful overview of the principal factors that the
Antitrust Division will consider when assessing the legality of such arrange-
ments.44 A factor given particular emphasis is the market power of the partici-
pant firms. As stated in the Guide, joint research projects that include "the
dominant firm or firms in an industry" pose special "antitrust concerns," 45
while projects involving only "a number of the smaller firms in an unconcen-
trated industry" are "particularly unlikely" to have illegal anticompetitive
effects. 46 Taking this distinction still further, the Guide states that joint re-
search ventures may be "presumptively lawful" if they are limited to partici-
pants whose market shares are so small that they could merge without being
challenged under the Justice Department's merger guidelines. 47 At the other
end of the spectrum, the Guide concludes that ventures involving the major
firms in an industry will be subjected to particularly sharp scrutiny. However,
rather than imposing an inflexible rule flatly prohibiting joint ventures among
dominant firms, the Guide expressly allows for consideration of the potential
"competitive justifications" for such projects.4 8 Finally, directing its atten-
tion to the antitrust ramifications of specific competitive restrictions in joint
venture arrangements, the Guide concludes that some restraints are so inher-
41. See, e.g., United States v. National Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 68,890
(N.D. Ohio), affdper curiam, 358 U.S. 38 (1958). It must be remembered, however, that a conspiracy may pass
Section 2 muster and still violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
42. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980).
43. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING
RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES (1980), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. (BNA) No. 992
(Special Supp. Dec. 4, 1980).
44. These factors include: the nature of the proposed research and the relative contributions of the
venture's participants; the structure of the industry and the relative positions of the venturers in the industry;
the scope and duration of the venture; justifications for the venture; and the accessibility of venture participa-
tion or the research results to outsiders. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDE CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES (1980).
45. Id. at Ii.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8-14.
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ently anticompetitive as to be "conclusively unreasonable" and, hence, per
se illegal,4 9 while other restraints are to be assessed by a rule of reason
standard.
50
Sources such as the Justice Department's Guide for Research Joint
Ventures and the Grinnell decision, discussed earlier in this article, suggest
that further refinements are needed in the basic test set forth in the Supreme
Court's American Tobacco and Griffith decisions for Section 2 conspiracies
that have actually achieved joint monopoly power. Under American Tobacco,
once the existence of a Section 2 conspiracy has been established, the market
shares or other indicators of market power of the individual conspirators can
be aggregated for purposes of determining whether the conspirators jointly
possess monopoly power.5 In making this determination, however, the
"relevant market" within which the conspiracy operates must first be identi-
fied, and it should not be enough that the conspiracy simply affects a signifi-
cant "amount" of interstate trade. 2
When the conspirators jointly possess monopoly power, the case will
take on special significance, calling for the application of rules unique to this
type of situation. While it still must be demonstrated under American
Tobacco that the conspirators have the "intent and purpose" to exercise their
combined monopoly power, the intent that must be shown is less demanding
than the "specific intent" required for Section 2 conspiracies that have not
yet achieved monopoly power. Instead, a prima facie case is established
under Griffith if the conspirators intended to engage in conduct having the
"necessary and direct result" of maintaining their monopoly power within the
defined relevant market. 3 Such a finding does not necessarily end the inquiry,
however, for consideration may still have to be given to the possible competi-
tive justifications for the challenged joint action. As indicated in the Justice
Department's Guide for Research Joint Ventures, some concerted
actions are so inherently anticompetitive as to be conclusively unreason-
able.54 Examples of these per se illegal combinations include agreements
among competitors to fix prices, to divide customers and territories, or to
drive competitors from a market through concerted refusals to deal. 55 If the
49. Id. at 14-15. Examples of "conclusively unreasonable" restraints given in the GUIDE include agree-
ments having the sole or primary purpose of fixing prices and dividing markets or customers, and most tying
arrangements and group boycotts.
50. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING
RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES 15 (1980). Examples given in the GUIDE of collateral restraints subject to rule of
reason analysis include the exchange of patents and know-how possessed by the participants who contribute
directly to the success of the research project, the division of particular aspects of the research among the
venturers, and agreements not to disclose the results of the joint research to outside parties until patents are
obtained.
51. See text accompanying notes 7-10 and 17-18 supra.
52. See text accompanying notes 23-34 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
54. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (monopolization by allocating markets,
acquiring competitors, and threatening discriminatory pricing); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948)
(joint monopolization by coercing suppliers into a refusal to deal with the conspirators' competitors on equal
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joint action is of this per se illegal character, then the inquiry ends, and no
further consideration need be given to alleged justifications for the challenged
Section 2 conspiracy.
If, however, the intended joint action is not conclusively unreasonable,
then the defendants should be afforded the opportunity of establishing the
competitive "reasonableness" of their intended actions, notwithstanding
their joint possession of monopoly power. The showing that must be made
will be particularly demanding because cases involving the joint possession of
actual monopoly power warrant less flexibility than either single firm
monopolization cases or Section 2 conspiracies that have not yet achieved
industry dominance.56 The potential hazards to competition increase when
companies replace individual competitive action with joint action, making
these cases inherently more suspect than single firm monopolization cases.
At the same time, the potential competitive justifications diminish as the
market power of the conspirators increases, thereby distinguishing Section 2
conspiracies in joint possession of monopoly power from the separate and
more controversial category of Section 2 conspiracy to which we now turn:
incipient conspiracies to monopolize that have not yet achieved monopoly
power.
II. CONSPIRACIES TO MONOPOLIZE IN WHICH THE CONSPIRATORS
Do NOT POSSESS MONOPOLY POWER
Conspiracies to monopolize in which the conspirators have not yet
achieved monopoly power have proved particularly troublesome for the
courts. Different courts have offered widely divergent opinions on just what
constitutes the essential elements of the offense. One group of court decisions
has construed the elements as essentially being: (1) proof of the conspiracy;
(2) specific intent to seize control of an appreciable amount of interstate
commerce; and (3) overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. 7 A second
group of judicial decisions has imposed a much more rigorous standard, re-
quiring showings of: (1) the existence of the conspiracy; (2) the relevant
market; (3) specific intent to acquire monopoly power within the relevant
market; and (4) overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. 8 The few com-
terms); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (joint monopolization through price fixing
and the allocation of raw materials).
56. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
57. See, e.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567, 576 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 219 F.2d 563, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. National City Lines, 186
F.2d 562, 567-68 (7th Cir. 1951); Giant Paper & Film Corp. v. Albemarle Paper Co., 430 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of South Carolina, 436 F. Supp. 418
(D.S.C. 1976), affd, 569 F.2d (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Service Oil
Co., 410 F. Supp. 1222, 1231-32 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
58. See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1980); Hudson Valley
Asbestos Corp. v. Tougher Heating & Plumbing Co., 510 F.2d 1140, 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418,420 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
mentators who have studied the subject are likewise in disagreement as to
precisely how to define the offense.59 The courts and commentators do agree,
however, that the essential elements of a conspiracy to monopolize do not
include the possession of actual monopoly power or a "dangerous probability
of success" that actual monopoly power will be achieved. 60
These differences of opinion are not simply a matter of esoteric semantics
but can most definitely affect the outcomes of particular cases. Consider, for
example, the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. National City
Lines.61 The case involved an agreement between several of the nation's
largest suppliers of busses, tires, and petroleum products to provide financing
to a group of local public transportation systems in return for their agreement
to purchase supplies exclusively from the suppliers for a ten year period.
While the dollar amount of commerce affected was substantial, it amounted to
an insignificant percentage of the total commerce in similar products. The
Seventh Circuit nevertheless upheld a Section 2 conspiracy conviction,
reasoning that it was sufficient that the defendants had conspired to control an
appreciable amount of interstate commerce. 62 Given the insignificant share of
the overall market affected by the conspiracy, it is highly doubtful that the
conviction would have been upheld if definition of the relevant market, rather
than just an appreciable amount of interstate commerce, had been required.6
Ironically, the source of the confusion in the lower courts is a 1947
decision in which the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the law of
conspiracies to monopolize, United States v. Yellow Cab Co.64 The case
involved an alleged Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 conspiracy between
a taxicab manufacturer and its cab operating subsidiaries in four major
American cities. The subsidiaries were required to purchase all of their
taxicabs from the parent manufacturer, thereby foreclosing competitors from
approximately 5,000 replacement cab sales. In relevant part, the complaint
alleged that the defendants had conspired to monopolize the sale of taxicabs
in the four cities where the subsidiaries operated.65 The trial court dismissed
the complaint for failing to state a cause of action, since the complaint had not
alleged an effect on total interstate cab sales. The Supreme Court reversed
59. For example, compare the standards for testing conspiracies to monopolize suggested by each of the
following: L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 132-34 (1977); J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE
REGULATION § 9.02(I)(a) (1979); Comment, The Relevant Market Concept in Conspiracy to Monopolize Cases
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980); Giant Paper&
Film Corp. v. Albemarle Paper Co., 430 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); and Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
61. 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1951).
62. Id. at 567-68.
63. As a further example, see Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 410 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1976),
involving a set of facts closely similar to those in National City Lines. The district court stated that it had
"serious reservations about the City Lines holding," but then held that it was compelled to follow that decision
and deny a defense request for summary judgment against an alleged Section 2 conspiracy targeted at a
-miniscule" share of the overall product market. Id. at 1231.
64. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
65. Id. at 226.
[Vol. 42:731
CONSPIRACIES TO MONOPOLIZE
and remanded the case, holding that the complaint allegations were sufficient
and that it was not necessary to plead the "importance of' the amount of
commerce affected by the conspiracy "in relation to" the "entire amount" of
that commerce throughout the United States. It was sufficient, reasoned the
Court, that the complaint alleged a conspiracy that might result in monopoli-
zation of "an appreciable segment" of interstate commerce. 6
The opinion in Yellow Cab is regrettably ambiguous. On the one hand,
the case can be read as rejecting proof of a defined relevant market as an
essential element in conspiracies to monopolize. Several lower court opinions
have construed the case in just this manner, holding that it is enough that any
appreciable "amount" of commerce is the subject of a Section 2 conspiracy.67
On the other hand, Yellow Cab can be viewed as simply rejecting a
requirement that Section 2 conspiracies be judged from the perspective of
total nationwide trade, as opposed to trade within some lesser segment of
commerce. At least one lower federal court has suggested this narrower
interpretation of the decision, concluding that, far from rejecting a relevant
market requirement, the Supreme Court was essentially proposing such a
requirement.6
For the sake of statutory consistency, let alone other reasons, the
narrower interpretation of Yellow Cab seems more sensible. Section 2 makes
it an offense to monopolize, or to attempt or conspire to monopolize, "any
part" of interstate commerce. The statutory reference to "any part" of
commerce has been construed to require proof of the relevant market in cases
of actual monopolization and attempted monopolization. 69 It is illogical for
courts to be using precisely this same statutory reference to justify the
elimination of a relevant market requirement from Section 2 conspiracy cases.
As stated by a court critical of the view that a relevant market need not be part
of a conspiracy to monopolize case: "[I]t is difficult to see why any part
should be defined differently in a conspiracy case than in a monopolization or
attempt-to-monopolize case, where it still requires definition of a relevant
market."
70
As discussed earlier in this Article,7 other equally compelling reasons
exist for requiring definition of the relevant market in Section 2 conspiracy
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567, 576 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. National City Lines, 186 F.2d
562, 567-68 (7th Cir. 1951).
68. See Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 410 F. Supp. 1222, 1231-32 (N.D. II. 1976).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, at 570-71 (1966) (requiring proof of the
relevant market in actual monopolization cases); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019,
1030 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring proof of the relevant market in an attempt case). Even the Ninth Circuit, which in
earlier decisions rejected a relevant market showing as part of a Section 2 attempt case, now considers relevant
market evidence as at least bearing upon the issue of "specific intent to monopolize." See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson
Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc. 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally ABA ANITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 60-63 (1975); J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTTIRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 9.01[4] (1979).
70. Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 410 F. Supp. 1222, 1232 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
71. See text accompanying notes 23-34 supra.
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cases. These cases are, by the very phrasing of the statutory offense,
concerned with conspiracies "to monopolize." A monopoly (i.e., the objec-
tive of such a conspiracy) is characterized by the possession of monopoly
power, meaning the power to control price and entry by actual and potential
72competitors. If the subject of the conspiracy is such that competitive
products would remain readily available, even assuming the complete success
of the conspiracy, then the conspiracy is not "intended" to achieve "control"
over industry price and production; control of these factors will in any event
remain beyond the conspirators' reach. Such a conspiracy, lacking, the
requisite "intent" to secure monopoly power, is not properly labeled a
conspiracy to monopolize, but is, at most, a Sherman Act Section 1
conspiracy in restraint of trade. To distinguish these non-monopoly-oriented
conspiracies from true conspiracies to monopolize, the availability of substi-
tute products or services becomes a potentially vital inquiry-an inquiry that
is, of course, of the very essence of defining a relevant market. Thus, the very
parameters of the offense seem to require relevant market considerations as
an essential part of a Section 2 conspiracy case.7'
With the notable exception of the relevant market issue, the courts and
commentators are in general agreement as to the other elements of a
conspiracy to monopolize in which the conspirators do not possess joint
monopoly power.74 These elements include: (1) the existence of the "con-
spiracy"; (2) "overt acts" in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) "specific
intent" to achieve monopoly power within the relevant market.75 The first
two of these elements are reasonably straightforward. The existence of the
conspiracy may, in unique cases, be established by the express statements of
the conspirators but is normally proven by the course of dealings between
them or other circumstantial evidence. 76 The overt acts that must be shown
need not be in themselves predatory, coercive or otherwise exclusionary. In
fact, virtually any affirmative action will, in theory at least, qualify, provided
that it is sufficient to demonstrate that the alleged conspiracy has gone beyond
the stage of idle speculation and has become an active agreement. Normally,
however, the overt acts will consist of activities that are in themselves
72. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (the power to "control prices
or exclude competition"); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (the power to
exclude actual or potential competition from the field").
73. See, e.g., Hudson Valley Asbestos Corp. v. Tougher Heating & Plumbing Co., 510 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). The Second Circuit considered the relative positions of the conspirators
within the relevant market as evidence of "the futility of any effort to monopolize" the market, and, hence, as
compelling evidence that "specific intent" was lacking. Id. at 1144.
74. See, e.g., the cases cited in notes 57-58 supra; L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 132-34 (1977); J. VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 9.02[1(a)] (1979).
75. Those courts that reject the necessity of proving a relevant market would phrase this element as:
"specific intent" to control an "appreciable part" of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Salco Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567, 576 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563,
573 (2d Cir. 1961).
76. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (conspiracy to monopolize
proven by parallel behavior and course of dealings between conspirators). See the cases and authorities cited in
note 17 supra.
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predatory or exclusionary, such as the allocation of territories or customers,
price fixing, or exclusive dealing requirements. 77
The third remaining element, proof of "specific intent," is conceptually a
much more difficult issue to resolve. An earlier portion of this Article
discussed the type of generalized intent that is required for Section 2
conspiracies in which the conspirators jointly possess monopoly power78 and
distinguished this broader concept of intent from the more demanding
"specific intent" required if joint monopoly power has not yet been
reached.79 This distinction does not tell us, however, precisely what is needed
to show specific intent, other than the fact that it is something more than the
generalized intent applicable to the more extreme Section 2 conspiracy cases
such as American Tobacco and Griffith, discussed in Part I of the Article.
Professors Areeda and Turner have correctly observed, in the context of
Section 2 attempts to monopolize, that "'specific intent' clearly cannot
include the mere intention to prevail over one's rivals. To declare that
intention unlawful would defeat the antitrust goal of encouraging competition
on the merits, which is heavily motivated by such an intent."8 ° Similar logic
would seem to apply with equal force to Section 2 conspiracies that have not
yet resulted in industry domination. Specific intent for these cases, too,
should not mean merely the intent to "prevail over one's rivals," even if such
an intention leans towards the establishment of industry dominance. To so
define the term is, in effect, to throw out the baby with the bath water.
Undesirable concerted action will be discouraged, but competitively desirable
joint action may likewise be thwarted. Such a result would not only lose sight
of, but also actually cut against, the very reason for prohibiting conspiracies
to monopolize: to discourage concerted action that threatens competition and
that, if left alone, could result in the joint acquisition of monopoly power.8'
Various courts and commentators have grappled with the analogous issue
of how to define "specific intent" for cases of attempted monopolization. s2 In
77. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (exclusive dealing requirements);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (allocation of raw materials and price fixing);
United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961) (allocation of customers and
coercing others into joining the conspiracy). See generally J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTrIRUST LAW AND
TRADE REGULATION § 9.02[3) (1979).
78. In such a case, the required "intent" is the intent to engage in joint conduct having the "necessary and
direct result" of further entrenching or maintaining the conspirators' joint monopoly power. See text accom-
panying notes 12-14 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Note that the Supreme Court drew an express distinction in
Griffith between the type of "intent" required where a conspiracy has obtained monopoly power and the more
demanding "specific intent" required if monopoly power has not yet been achieved. United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
80. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER. ANTITRUST LAW 822a, at 314 (1977) (footnote omitted).
81. Contra, Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1980).
82. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 822a, at 314 (1977); L. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST 136 (1977); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the
Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 375, 395 (1974). A recent and particularly insightful
decision on defining specific intent for attempted monopolization cases is the Federal Trade Commission's
decision in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 9108, 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980), in which the Commision
reasoned that the intent that must be established is an intent to achieve monopoly power through conduct that is
predatory or otherwise competitively unreasonable.
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essence, the solution frequently proposed is to defime "specific intent" as the
intent to achieve monopoly power through conduct that is "predatory or
otherwise unreasonable., 83 This definition offers the obvious advantage of
built-in flexibility comparable to that of the Sherman Act Section 1 rule of
reason. A similar approach, with its desirable flexibility, seems proper for
Section 2 conspiracy cases in which actual joint monopolization has not yet
been achieved. Thus, the specific intent required for these cases would not
simply be the intent to acquire monopoly power but, instead, the intent to
acquire such power through joint conduct that is predatory or otherwise
competitively unreasonable.
Some intended joint conduct will be so clearly predatory or exclusionary
as to readily meet such a test without the necessity of an in-depth assessment
of the competitive reasonableness of the conduct. 84 Other intended conduct
will be less obviously anticompetitive and will require consideration of a
number of possible factors bearing upon the competitive "reasonableness" of
the conduct, such as the industry structure, the conspirators' relative
positions within the industry, the purported purpose of the conduct and its
impact upon competition, and the availability of less restrictive alternatives.
85
A definition of specific intent that makes allowance for these and other
potentially relevant competitive considerations will promote the underlying
purposes of the Sherman Act while not proscribing concerted action that, far
from threatening competition, actually promotes it.
Part I of this Article similarly concluded that not all joint conduct that
tends towards the establishment or maintenance of monopoly power is
prohibited by Section 2, even where the parties engaging in the conduct have
already achieved actual joint monopoly power. Consideration should still be
given to possible competitive justifications for the conduct, provided that the
conduct is not so clearly anticompetitive as to be conclusively unreasonable.
86
Part I concluded that where joint monopoly power has already been achieved
by the defendants, the potential risks to competition resulting from their joint
action become particularly great, so that the burden of establishing the
competitive justifications for the conduct becomes especially demanding.
The same is not necessarily true, however, of Section 2 conspiracies in which
the participants do not yet possess joint market control. Assume, for
example, that the challenged joint conduct consists of a product development
83. See note 82 supra.
84. See the examples in note 55 supra. As recently stated by the Ninth Circuit: "Such clearly exclusionary
behavior, even though it poses no immediate measurable danger to the market, presents the potential for
mischief. To the extent that such conduct inevitably harms competition, there is little reason to tolerate it."
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 1980).
85. For a general discussion of the considerations involved in a rule of reason type analysis, see generally
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); and United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th
Cir. 1980).
86. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
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venture among the smaller firms within an industry dominated by much larger
firms not privy to the venture. Further assume that the costs and risks of the
venture are such that it will not attract participants unless they are given
exclusive rights in the fruits of the venture. This exclusivity may be quite
proper in such a situation, even though inappropriate if attached to a venture
involving the dominant firms within the industry. Competition may actually
be enhanced as the smaller firms become more effective competitors with the
industry giants. Thus, greater flexibility is needed when assessing the
competitive reasonableness of joint action among alleged Section 2 conspir-
ators not yet in possession of actual industry control than would be appro-
priate if they already had secured such control.
In summary, Section 2 conspiracies in which the conspirators do not
individually or jointly possess monopoly power raise significant issues that
distinguish these cases from the more egregious Section 2 conspiracies
discussed in Part I of this Article. As a result, they are to be judged by a
different legal standard. The proper elements of this standard include: (1) the
existence of the conspiracy;8 (2) the relevant market within which the
conspiracy operates; 8 (3) specific intent to achieve monopoly power within
the relevant market through acts that are predatory or otherwise competi-
tively unreasonable, as opposed to the more generalized intent applicable to
Section 2 conspiracies in which the conspirators possess joint monopoly
power;8 9 and (4) overt acts demonstrating that the conspiracy has gone
beyond the stage of mere idle speculation and has become an actual
agreement. 9°
III. CONCLUSION AND DECISIONAL MODEL
Considerable controversy and confusion abound in the courts concerning
the essential elements of a Sherman Act Section 2 conspiracy to monopolize.
A careful reading of leading judicial decisions on the subject reveals that this
confusion has largely resulted from a failure to distinguish between two very
different types of conspiracies that have been challenged under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. The first type of Section 2 conspiracy, discussed in Part I of
the Article, involves those conspiracies to monopolize in which the conspira-
tors jointly possess monopoly power. The Supreme Court's decisions in
American Tobacco and Griffith are illustrative of this first type of case. The
second form of Section 2 conspiracy, discussed in Part II of the Article,
encompasses those conspiracies to monopolize in which the conspirators
have not individually or jointly achieved monopoly power. The governing
legal principles are markedly different, depending upon which type of Section
2 conspiracy is at issue in a given case.
87. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 78-86 supra.
90. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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This Article identified specific factors to be considered when assessing
the antitrust legality of each type of Sherman Act Section 2 conspiracy. When
these factors are combined into a single framework, they provide a coordi-
nated decisional model that can be used by practitioners and the courts in
analyzing conspiracy cases brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
components of the decisional model are as follows:
(1) The existence of a Section 2 conspiracy must first be demonstrated,
whether by the express statements of the conspirators, the course of
dealings between them, or other circumstantial evidence.
(2) The relevant market within which the conspiracy operates must
also be defined.
(3) Once the existence of the conspiracy has been established, the
market shares or other evidence of market power of the individual conspir-
ators can be aggregated for purposes of determining whether the conspir-
ators possess joint monopoly power. If the conspirators do not possess such
joint power, then the analysis should proceed to step (7) below.
(4) If the conspirators have joint monopoly power, it must additionally
be shown that they intended to engage in concerted action having the
"necessary and direct result" of maintaining their combined monopoly
position within the relevant market, i.e., "general intent" must be proven.
(5) It must be shown that the conspirators have engaged in overt acts
demonstrating that the conspiracy has gone beyond the stage of mere idle
speculation. These overt acts need not be in themselves predatory or
exclusionary, and may even consist of the very same acts used to
prove circumstantially the existence of the conspiracy and the conspirators'
general intent.
(6) Unless the conduct in which the conspirators intended to engage is
conclusively unreasonable, the defendants should be afforded the opportun-
ity of proving the competitive reasonableness of their conduct.
(7) If the conspirators do not have joint monopoly power, then once
the conspiracy and the existence of the relevant market have been estab-
lished it must be shown that the conspirators specifically intended to achieve
monopoly power within the relevant market through acts that are predatory
or otherwise competitively unreasonable. Unless the acts in which the
conspirators intended to engage are clearly predatory or exclusionary, the
competitive unreasonableness of the intended conduct must be affirma-
tively demonstrated, with a view to such considerations as the industry
structure, the conspirators' relative positions within the industry, the
purported purpose of the conduct and its impact upon competition, and the
availability of less restrictive alternatives.
(8) Finally, to demonstrate that the conspiracy has moved beyond the
stage of mere idle speculation and has become an active agreement to
achieve monopoly power, overt acts must be shown.
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